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Abstract
The externalist says that your evidence could fail to tell you what evidence you do
or not do have. In that case, it could be rational for you to be uncertain about
what your evidence is. This is a kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesian epis-
temology has difficulty modeling. For, if externalism is correct, then the orthodox
Bayesian learning norms of conditionalization and reflection are inconsistent with
each other. I recommend that an externalist Bayesian reject conditionalization. In
its stead, I provide a new theory of rational learning for the externalist. I defend
this theory by arguing that its advice will be followed by anyone whose learning
dispositions maximize expected accuracy. I then explore some of this theory’s con-
sequences for the rationality of epistemic akrasia, peer disagreement, undercutting
defeat, and uncertain evidence.
O rthodox Bayesian epistemology is designed to model rational uncertainty.1When you lack relevant evidence, its norms permit uncertainty about var-
ious and sundry matters: the weather, the victor, the price of tea in China. But
there is a certain kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesianism has more dif-
ficulty modeling: uncertainty about what evidence you do or do not possess.
Influential arguments in support of orthodox Bayesianism take for granted that
your evidence will always tell you what your total evidence is, so that there may be
no uncertainty about what your evidence says. Let’s call this thesis ‘internalism’,
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1 As I’ll understand the position, orthodox Bayesianism is committed to at least the following
theses: probabilism, which says that rational credences are (at least finitely additive) probabil-
ities; conditionalization, which says that you should be disposed to learn from your evidence
by conditioning on it (see §2), and van Fraassen’s principle of reflection, which says that your
current credences should equal your expectation of your future credences (see §2.1). For each
of these assumptions, there are epistemologists justly called ‘Bayesian’ who deny it; but these
assumptions compose a familiar, ‘off-the-shelf ’ Bayesian theory of rationality.
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and let’s call its negation ‘externalism’.2 The externalist thinks that your evidence
could fail to tell you what evidence you have or don’t have, in which case, it could
be rational for you to be uncertain about what your evidence is.
Both internalism and externalism have able defenders. Myself, I’m undecided.
I can feel the force of arguments on both sides. So I won’t be defending either
position here. Instead, I will be asking: what becomes of orthodox Bayesianism
if externalism is correct? And on this question, I am decided. The externalist
Bayesian should reject the orthodox learning norm (or updating rule) of condi-
tionalization. This is a lesson I’ve learned from Salow (2018), who teaches that,
if an externalist Bayesian follows conditionalization, then they will be capable of
engaging in acts of deliberate self-delusion—repeatedly ‘learning’ from experience
in such a way as to raise their rational credence in some proposition as high as they
like, even when the proposition is false. It is difficult to see this as rational inquiry.
So I recommend that the externalist reject conditionalization. In its stead, I will
advance a new theory of rational learning for the externalist. I’ll defend this theory
by arguing that its advice will be followed by anyone whose learning dispositions
maximize expected accuracy. And I’ll show that those who follow this theory’s
advice will be incapable of engaging in deliberate self-delusion.
Assuming evidentialism—that is, assuming that the rationality of your doxas-
tic states is determined by the evidence you possess—externalism entails that your
evidence could fail to tell you whether your doxastic states are rational or not. For
this reason, externalism has played a starring role in recent debates about the ratio-
nality of epistemic akrasia. Some externalists have held that your evidence could
make it likely both that it will rain and that your evidence doesn’t make it likely
that it will rain. In that case, they have proposed that it is rational for you to be
epistemically akratic, believing both that it will rain and that it’s irrational to be-
lieve that it will rain. Relatedly, some externalists have held that the disagreement
of an epistemic peer—who has all the evidence that you do, and is equally good
at evaluating it as you are—may give you reason to think that your belief in rain
was irrationally formed; nevertheless, this need not give you any reason to revise
your views about the weather.3
The externalist theory of learning I’ll develop here yields a distinctive form of
externalism, according to which certain kinds of epistemic akrasia are always irra-
2 Internalism is presupposed by the Lewis-Teller diachronic Dutch book argument for condition-
alization (for more, see Gallow 2017), as well as the more recent accuracy (or ‘epistemic utility’)
arguments for conditionalization from Greaves &Wallace and Briggs & Pettigrew (forth-
coming) (for more, see Schoenfield 2017a). For justifications of conditionalization which do
not presuppose internalism, see (for instance) van Fraassen (1989, ch. 13), Lange (1999), Leit-
geb & Pettigrew (2010b), Titelbaum (2013, ch. 7), Gallow (2019), and Zendejas Medina
(ms).
3 For more, see Elga (2013), Weatherson (ms, 2013), Horowitz (2014), Greco (2014),
Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, 2015, forthcoming), and §3.
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tional; and, if the disagreement of an epistemic peer gives you reason to think that
your beliefs were irrationally formed, then it can be rational for you to ‘conciliate’
with that peer after learning of the disagreement. It additionally gives guidance
in cases of undercutting defeat, and learning experiences in which certainty in no
proposition has been rationalized. The latter cases are usually treated with Jef-
frey conditionalization (see Jeffrey, 1965). My past self treated the former with
a norm I called holistic conditionalization (Gallow, 2014). I will show that, in
the paradigm cases, the theory defended here agrees with both of these learning
norms.
1 Internalism and Externalism
In general, to be an internalist is to think that some condition must always lie
within your epistemic reach. Given some condition c , an internalist says: if you
satisfy c , then you must have access to the fact that you satisfy c . An externalist,
in contrast, says that you may satisfy c without having access to the fact that
you satisfy c . Different conditions and different kinds of access yield different
forms of internalism and externalism. For instance: let the condition be being in
pain, and say that you have access to a fact when you know it. We then get the
internalist thesis that, if you are in pain, you must know that you are in pain, and
the corresponding externalist thesis that youmay be in pain without knowing that
you are in pain.
To get the form of internalism that I’ll be interested in, let the condition be
possessing the total evidence e , and say that you have access to a fact when it is part of
your evidence. Then, the internalist says: whenever e is your total evidence, your
evidence must say that e is your total evidence. The externalist: on the contrary,
sometimes e can be your total evidence without your evidence telling you that e
is your total evidence.4
Internalism
If e is your total evidence, then your evidence must tell you that e is
your total evidence.
 (Te → ETe )
Externalism
You may have the total evidence e without your evidence telling you
that e is your total evidence.
◊ (Te ∧¬ETe )
4 Throughout, ‘e ’, ‘ f ’, and ‘φ’ are meta-variables ranging over propositions. I’ll use ‘e ’ and ‘ f ’
when I’m presupposing that the proposition is potentially your evidence. I’ll use ‘φ’ when I’m
not making this presupposition.
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Throughout, I’ll use ðEeñ to mean that your evidence says (at least) that e , and
ðTeñ to mean that your evidence tells you e and no more (that is: that e is your
total evidence).
We may provide a semantics for the operators E and T with Kripke models.
On that semantics, E is a familiar necessity modal—ðEe ñ is true at a possible
world w iff ð e ñ is true at all worlds to which w bears an accessibility relation, R .
T is less familiar, but its semantics is simple enough: ðTe ñ is true at w iff ð e ñ is
true at all and only worlds to which w bears R . Let’s assume that evidence must be
consistent, so that, if your evidence says that e , then your evidence must not also
say that ¬e : (Ee →¬E¬e ). Then, internalism is equivalent to the conjunction
of the Positive Access principle, (Ee → EEe ), and the Negative Access principle,
(¬Ee → E¬Ee ). Positive Access says that your evidence always tells you what
evidence you have. Negative Access says that your evidence always tells you what
evidence you don’t have.5
Because internalism entails both Positive Access and Negative Access, an argu-
ment against either is an argument against internalism. Since externalism is just
the negation of internalism, an argument against either Positive or Negative Access
is an argument for externalism.
Williamson argues for externalism in just this way. He contends that cases
of perceptual illusion counterexample Negative Access. In the bad case, you look
at a white wall illuminated with red lighting. In the good case, you look at a red
wall illuminated with white lighting. In the bad case, your evidence doesn’t tell
you that the wall is red, nor does it rule out that you are in the good case. In the
good case, your evidence does tell you that the wall is red. So, in the bad case,
your evidence does not tell you that you don’t have the evidence that the wall is
red. Even so, you don’t have this evidence. So, in the bad case, ¬Er ∧¬E¬Er ,
where ‘r ’ says that the wall is red. SoNegative Access is false. The internalist could
deny that, in the good case, your evidence tells you that the wall is red. Rather,
they may say, in both the good and the bad case, your evidence merely tells you
that the wall appears red, and/or that you believe the wall is red. Alternatively,
they could say: in the bad case, even though the wall isn’t red, your evidence still
tells you that the wall is red.
Williamson additionally argues that cases in which your perceptual knowl-
edge is inexact counterexample Positive Access. Off in the distance, you catch a
glimpse of an unmarked clock (see figure 1a). Your vision is good enough for you
to get the evidence that the hand is on the right-hand side of the clock. And
though you likely learn something stronger still, you don’t learn the precise lo-
5 If we assume that your evidence is factive—that, if your evidence tells you that e , then e must
be true, (Ee → e )—then Negative Access entails Positive Access. But if we merely assume that
evidence is consistent, Negative and Positive Access are logically independent.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: A distant and brief glimpse at the unmarked clock (1a) provides the evidence
that the clock hand is positioned within some interval of values [a, b ] (1b); and you’ve
learned that, if the clock hand is positioned at b , then the glimpse does not provide the
evidence that the clock hand is no further than b (1c). These assumptions contradict the
Positive Access principle, (Ee → EEe ).
cation of the clock hand.6 At most, you learn that the clock hand is located in
some interval (see figure 1b). Grant also that your evidence will leave a ‘margin-
for-error’, so that, if the clock hand is located at a position b , then you won’t learn
that the clock hand is located within some interval that has b as an endpoint (see
figure 1c). Grant not only that this is true, but that you’ve learned it.
These assumptions contradict Positive Access. For the following three claims
are inconsistent (In the following, I use ‘H ’ as a variable for the position of the
clock hand).
A1) The most your evidence tells you about the position of the clock hand is
that it lies in some interval [a, b ], with a < b .
A2) Your evidence says that: if the clock hand is located at b , then your evidence
won’t tell you that it is located no further than b (since your evidence must
leave a margin-for-error).
E[H = b → ¬E(H ¶ b )]
A3) Your evidence tells you what evidence you have.
Ee → EEe
To see that these three claims are inconsistent, note that we can get (A4) by
contraposition on (A2):
E [E(H ¶ b ) → H ̸= b ](A4)
Assuming that the evidence operator E satisfies the K -axiom (E(φ → ψ) →
6 Throughout, I will use ðlearn that eñ to mean ðacquire evidence which tells you that eñ.
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(Eφ→ Eψ)), (A4) entails (A5).
EE(H ¶ b ) → E (H ̸= b )(A5)
(A1) entails (A6).
E(H ¶ b )(A6)
From (A6) and (A3), we have
EE(H ¶ b )(A7)
And from (A7) and (A5),
E(H ̸= b )(A8)
But (A8) contradicts (A1), which assured us that the strongest thing you learned
about the position of the clock hand was that it was within the interval [a, b ].
Since this does not entail H ̸= b , (A1) tells us that you cannot have learned it.7
So (A1), (A2), and (A3) are inconsistent. Williamson thinks that (A3) is the
least plausible of the three; but others, like Salow (2018) and Stalnaker (2009),
choose instead to reject (A2) and retain Positive Access.8
Williamson’s unmarked clock is a nice example of the kinds of cases exter-
nalists take to be possible, if not commonplace. However, the example is more
complicated than it needs to be for my purposes. So let me introduce a simplified
model of the unmarked clock. In this model, the clock hand may point at one
of four positions: 1, 2, 3, or 4 (See figure 2). If it points at 1, then, since your
evidence must leave a margin-for-error, it will leave open that it points at 4 or 2
instead, and your total evidence will just be that it does not point at 3 (figure 2a).
Likewise, if it points at 2, then, since your evidence must leave a margin-for-error,
your total evidence will be that it does not point at 4 (figure 2b). In general, your
total evidence will be that the clock hand is not at the position opposite its actual
position. This model is simplistic and psychologically implausible, but the lessons
we learn from it will carry over to the more realistic cases, so I’ll continue to focus
on this simplified model throughout.
Let me introduce some (stipulative) terminology. I’ll call a set of proposi-
7 The reader may be wondering whether this contradiction may be avoided by exchanging (A1)’s
closed interval [a, b ] for an open one (a, b )—call the resulting claim ‘(A1∗)’. (A1∗) will be in-
consistent with and (A3) and the following principle, for any choice of ε > 0, no matter how
small: E [H = b − ε→¬E(H < b )]. (The reasoning is exactly the same as in the body, mutatis
mutandis.)
8 Stalnaker (2009) does not explicitly discuss the positive access principle for evidence; his focus
is the positive access for rational belief : if it’s rational to believe that φ, then it’s rational to
believe that it’s rational to believe that φ.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: A simplified model of Williamson’s unmarked clock. The clock hand could
point at position 1, 2, 3, or 4. If it points at 1, your total evidence will be that it’s not at 3
(2a). If it points at 2, your total evidence will be that it’s not at 4 (2b), and similarly for
positions 3 and 4. Your experiment, then, is E = {¬3,¬4,¬1,¬2}.
tions, E = {e1, e2, . . . , eN }, an experiment. Intuitively, the set E contains all and
only the propositions which may be your total evidence. Let’s say (again, as a
terminological stipulation) that you are conducting the experiment E iff: for each
ei ∈ E , ei may be your total evidence, and, moreover, your total evidence must
be one of the ei ∈ E . This is a broad notion of ‘conducting an experiment’. All it
takes to conduct an experiment in this sense is for there to be a set of propositions
you might come to learn. Opening a drawer to find pens, checking the front page
of the New York Times, and looking at your wristwatch could all count as con-
ducting an experiment in this sense.9 In our simplified model of Williamson’s
clock, you will either acquire the total evidence ¬3 (you’ll learn this iff 1 is true),
the total evidence ¬4 (which you’ll learn iff 2 is true), the total evidence ¬1 (iff
3 is true), or the total evidence ¬2 (iff 4 is true).10 So your experiment is the set
{¬4,¬3,¬2,¬1}.
2 Updating
Let me assume that you have opinions about how likely various propositions are.
I’ll call these opinions of yours credences, and I’ll represent them with a function,
C (for ‘credence’), from propositions to numbers between 0% and 100%. The
interpretation is that C (φ) represents how likely you take the proposition φ to
be. I’ll assume throughout that, if you are rational, then C will be a probabil-
ity function.11 I will also assume that, in addition to these credences, you have
9 I borrow this terminology from Greaves & Wallace (2006).
10 Here, I am using ‘n’ to stand for the proposition that the clock hand points at position n—a
convention I’ll continue to follow throughout.
11 In general, your opinions may not be defined over a (σ-)algebra—a set of propositions contain-
ing the tautology, ⊤, and closed under negation and (countable) union. The usual probability
axioms assume that C is defined over a set of propositions like this. But we may be less demand-
ing and count your opinions as probabilistic so long as there is some probability, defined over a
full (σ-)algebra, which agrees with you wherever you are opinionated.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: In figure 3a, your current credences. You think the hand is equally likely to be
at any of the four positions. In figure 3b, the credences condi says you should be disposed
to adopt upon learning that ¬4 (and no more). You should become certain that ¬4, and
you should think that the hand is equally likely to be at any of the remaining positions.
learning dispositions to revise or update your credences in the light of the evidence
e ∈ E . Let’s model these learning dispositions with a function, D (for ‘dispo-
sition’), from propositions which might be your total evidence, e ∈ E , to new
credence functions. The interpretation is that De (the output of the function D ,
given the input e ) is the credence function you are disposed to adopt, if your total
evidence is e .12 I will think about these dispositions the same way I think about
dispositions more generally: an individual’s disposition may be characterized by a
certain stimulus condition, and a certain response which the individual is disposed
to manifest in the stimulus condition. For you to have the learning dispositions
represented by D is for you to be disposed to adopt the new credence function
De in the stimulus condition of having your evidence tell you e (and no more).
Therefore, for each e ∈ E , I’ll assume that, in all possibilities in which your total
evidence is e , you will adopt the credence function De .
Which learning dispositions are rational? How should you be disposed to
learn from your evidence? The orthodox Bayesian answer to this question is: you
should be disposed to learn from the total evidence e by conditioning on e . For
instance, in our simplified model ofWilliamson’s clock, suppose that you start out
thinking the hand is equally likely to be at any position—as in figure 3a. Upon
receiving the total evidence ¬4, conditionalization says that you should become
certain that ¬4, and you should think that each of the remaining positions are
equally likely—as in figure 3b. Likewise, if you learn that ¬1,¬2, or ¬3 instead,
you should be disposed to become certain in your total evidence, and continue to
think that the remaining positions are equally likely. In general, conditionaliza-
tion says:
12 Elsewhere, functions like these are referred to as ‘epistemic acts’, ‘strategies’, ‘plans’, and ‘credal
gambles’.
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Conditionalization
Be disposed to respond to the total evidence e by adopting your cur-
rent credence function, C , conditioned on e .
(condi) De (φ)
!= C (φ | e )
(I place an exclamation over an equals sign to say that the equality ought to hold.
condi does not claim that De (φ) will be C (φ | e )—it says instead that it should
be.)
I’ve come to believe that the externalist should not endorse condi in full
generality, for at least two reasons: firstly, because externalist conditionalizers must
accept the rationality of deliberate self-delusion (§2.1); and, secondly, because if
externalism is correct, then pursuing accurate credences will lead you to violate
condi (§2.2).
2.1 Externalism, Conditionalization, and Self-Delusion
Return to our simplified model of Williamson’s clock, and suppose that, before
looking, a reliable source informs you that the clock hand is not at position 4.
Learning this also teaches you that a glimpse at the clock won’t teach you that ¬2.
However, since the clock hand could still point at either 1, 2, or 3, a glimpse at the
clock could still teach either ¬3,¬4, or ¬1. (Of course, you already know ¬4, so
if that’s what your glimpse tells you, you won’t learn anything new.) So, in taking
a glimpse at the clock, you will be conducting the experiment E = {¬3,¬4,¬1}.
If, before looking, you think the clock hand is just as likely to be at 1 as it is
to be at 2 or 3, then your credences will be as shown in figure 4a. If you learn ¬3
(and no more) and you condition on this evidence, then your credence that 2 will
rise to 1/2, as shown in figure 4b. Likewise, if you learn ¬1 (and no more) and you
condition on this evidence, then your credence that 2 will rise to 1/2, as shown
in figure 4d. If, on the other hand, you learn ¬4 (no more) and you condition
on this, then since you were already certain of ¬4, your credence in 2 will remain
unchanged; it will stay put at 1/3, as shown in figure 4c.
So, when conducting the experiment {¬3,¬4,¬1}, if you are disposed to
condition on your total evidence, then your credence that 2 is guaranteed to not
fall, and it may rise. Notice also that, in advance, you can recognize that your
credence that 2 will rise if and only if the clock hand is not at 2. Of course,
rational learning dispositions may end up taking you further from the truth in
some circumstances. What’s going on here is more disturbing than that. It’s not
just that these learning dispositions may take you further from the truth—they
are actually quite likely to do so. Moreover, your updated credence that 2 is anti-
correlated with the truth about whether 2. And you are certain in advance to end
up no closer to the truth about whether 2.
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(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Figure 4: In figure 4a, your current credences. In figure 4b, the credences condi says
you should be disposed to adopt upon learning that ¬3 (and no more). In figure 4c,
the credences condi says you should be disposed to adopt upon learning that ¬4 (and
no more). And, in figure 4d, the credences condi says you should be disposed to adopt
upon learning that ¬1 (and no more).
Salow (2018) draws our attention to another disturbing feature of these learn-
ing dispositions. With learning dispositions like these, you could engage in a kind
of intentionally biased inquiry—inquiry which you expect to raise your rational
credence in some proposition, even when that proposition is false. To borrow
Salow’s example: let ‘p ’ be the proposition that you are popular (or that you’re
not—whichever you’d prefer to believe). Suppose that your rational credence that
p is 1/3 (though the precise value won’t matter). Then, if your learning disposi-
tions conform to condi, here’s a recipe for raising your credence that p: first, tell
a confidant who knows the truth about p to place the clock hand at position 2
iff p is true. If p is false, then they should flip a coin to decide between position
1 and 3. Then, you will be conducting the experiment E = {¬3,¬4,¬1}, and,
before looking, you will have the credences from figure 4a. You’ll think you’re
2/3rds likely to end up 50% sure that the clock hand is at position 2. Since you’re
certain that 2 ↔ p, you’ll think that you’re 2/3rds likely to end up thinking p
is 50% likely. In fact, you are certain in advance that, so long as p is false, you’ll
end up 50% sure that p is true. And there’s no reason this experiment need be
conducted only once. Run through the whole exercise again, and you could raise
yours credence that p to 2/3, and—why not?—again, raising it to 4/5, and again,
raising it to 8/9, and so on and so forth. So long as p is false, you can end up with
a credence in p which is as high as you like. (And there’s no danger of lowering
your credence in p. If p is true, you’ll still end up with a credence of 1/3 in p.)
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It is incredibly difficult to see this as rational inquiry. Designing this experi-
ment and adopting these learning dispositions is an act of deliberate self-delusion,
not a rational search for truth. Let us lay this down as a principle.13
No Self-Delusion
If you are disposed to raise your credence that φ in response to some
potential evidence which you’ll learn with positive probability, then
you must also be disposed to lower your credence that φ in response
to some potential evidence.
From my perspective, no self-delusion is non-negotiable.14 You may be in-
clined to disagree because you think that rational agents can be deluded by their
past selves. For instance: Cypher decides to enter the matrix and erase his mem-
ories of the world outside. He intentionally deludes himself about the external
world. But, even so, the beliefs he adopts once inside the matrix, with his mem-
ories erased, are the rational ones to adopt given his evidence. I agree, but I don’t
think this puts any pressure on the principle no self-delusion. We should distin-
guish the deluded Cypher inside the matrix from the deluding Cypher who makes
the decision to put his future self there. We may forgive the deluded Cypher
without forgiving his deluding past self. Similarly, we should distinguish your
pre-experimental self, who has designed this experiment and is disposed to be-
come more confident that p iff p is false, and your post-experimental self, who has
updated on their evidence and is now more confident that p is true. By analogy
with Cypher, you may suggest that your post-experimental self is rational, even
though your pre-experimental self is not. I would disagree—Cypher has forgot-
ten how he got there, you have not, and this difference makes a difference with
respect to epistemic rationality. However, even if your suggestion is granted, it
does not conflict with no self-delusion. This principle is only evaluating the
learning dispositions of your pre-experimental self; it says nothing about the opin-
ions of your post-experimental self. What it condemns are dispositions to learn
from your evidence which give some proposition a chance of being confirmed
while simultaneously protecting it from ever being disconfirmed.15
13 A very similar principle is called ‘Disconfirmability’ in White (2006, p. 544), where it is at-
tributed to an early draft of Pryor (2004). If we assume internalism, and that you’re certain to
update on your total evidence, then this principle follows from condi.
14 Why require that the evidence which raises your credence that φ have positive probability?
Suppose a number will be randomly selected from the unit interval and you’ll learn its true
value. Let φ be the proposition that the number will be 1/
p
2. Then, your current credence
that φ will be zero, and it will not get any lower no matter what you learn, but if you learn that
φ is true, your credence that φ will jump up to 100%. This would be a counterexample to no
self-delusion if we didn’t require that you have a positive probability of learning the evidence
mentioned in the antecedent.
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this point.
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So long as externalism commits us to the possibility of designing experi-
ments like E = {¬3,¬4,¬1}, externalism, conditionalization, and no self-
delusion are inconsistent.16 I, for one, am not prepared to renounce no self-
delusion. Nor is Salow, who suggests rejecting externalism. Perhaps that is
the correct lesson to draw. However, I believe that a plausible externalist position
is left standing. This is a version of externalism which accepts no self-delusion
by denying conditionalization. In §2.2, I will provide the externalist with
an alternative to conditionalization. This alternative will always abide by no
self-delusion.
No self-delusion prohibits an extreme kind of biased inquiry—inquiry
which is guaranteed to leave you no less confident in some proposition, and leaves
a positive probability of you becoming more confident. The reasons we have to
call this kind of biased inquiry irrational carry over to inquiries which you merely
expect to leave you more confident in some proposition. Say that your learning
dispositions are biased in favor of a proposition φ iff, when you have those learn-
ing dispositions, you expect your updated credence thatφ to be greater than your
current credence that φ. Similarly, say that your learning dispositions are biased
against φ iff you expect your updated credence thatφ to be less than your current
credence thatφ. Then, your learning dispositions are unbiased iff, for all proposi-
tionsφ, your current credence thatφ is equal to your expectation of your updated
credence that φ. Let’s use ðUeñ to stand for the proposition that you’ve updated
on the proposition e—that is: ðUeñ says that you have taken your total evidence
to be e , and, in response, adopted the new credence function you are disposed
to adopt in that stimulus condition.17 Thus: when your learning dispositions are
given by D , ðUeñ says that you’ve taken your evidence to be e and adopted the
new credence function De in response. To say that your learning dispositions
should be unbiased is just to say that, for all propositions φ, your expectation of




De (φ) ·C (Ue ) != C (φ)
16 Cf. Hild (1998a,b), who argues that externalism and conditionalization are inconsistent with
reflection (see below). Note that no self-delusion is a weakening of reflection.
17 Thus: even if you are disposed to adopt the same credence function when Te as you are when
T f —even if De = D f —the propositions that you’ve updated on e is a different proposition
from the proposition that you’ve updated on f . If you’ve updated on e , then you must have (in
some sense) taken e to be your evidence; whereas, if you’ve updated on f , then you must have
(in some sense) taken your evidence to be f . As I’m understanding it, ‘taking your evidence
to be e ’ need not involve any belief that your evidence is e . For instance, you could hold that
having an appropriate sub-personal mechanism categorize your experience as representing that
e is one way of taking your evidence to be e .
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This is van Fraassen (1984, 1995)’s principle of reflection.18 (Notice that, as
I’m understanding it, reflection is a constraint on your learning dispositions.)
Salow’s insight is that your learning dispositions will be biased if and only if they
violate reflection. Since biased learning dispositions are irrational, reflection
is rationally required.
If internalism is correct, and you are certain to update on your total evidence,
then reflection follows from condi.19 So the internalist conditionalizer who
is certain that they will correctly update on their evidence will always satisfy re-
flection.20 Notice that reflection entails no self-delusion—if your credence
that φ has some positive probability of rising and no probability of falling, then
your expectation of your new credence that φ will exceed your current credence
that φ. So an internalist conditionalizer who is certain to update on their total
evidence will not be capable of engaging in this kind of deliberate self-delusion.
So long as the externalist thinks that experiments like {¬3,¬4,¬1} are possi-
ble, they must choose between condi and reflection. I believe that they should
choose reflection. Looking ahead: the externalist update I will propose in §2.2
below will always satisfy the principle of reflection.
2.2 Externalism and the Pursuit of Accuracy
Your credence function encodes your opinions about how likely various propo-
sitions are. If we know whether those propositions are true or false, we can ask:
how close to the truth did you get? That is, we can ask: how accurate were your
credences? I’ll assume that we have some way of measuring the accuracy of a
credence function, given all the facts. Since all the facts are settled by which pos-
sible world is actual, I’ll assume that we have some measure of the accuracy of
the credence function C at the world w : A (C ,w ). There are several accuracy
measures which have been defended in the recent literature.21 However, for my
purposes here, the only thing I need assume about the measureA is that it has
18 van Fraassen also makes the stronger claim that C (φ |Ue ) != De (φ). The principle I’m calling
‘reflection’ follows from this claim and the law of total probability. As I’ll understand reflec-
tion, it governs your dispositions to learn from the evidence acquired in experiments which you
are about to conduct, and during which you are certain to not lose evidence. So understood,
reflection escapes many of the usual counterexamples (see Briggs (2009) for a nice taxonomy
of the counterexamples). Those which remain involve credences de se et nunc. Credence de se et
nunc will require us to reject or qualify reflection. Still, I’ll ignore these complications for the
nonce.
19 If internalism is true, then you are certain that e ↔ Te , so C (φ | e ) = C (φ | Te ). And if
you are certain to update on your total evidence, then C (Ue ) = C (Te ). So, if your learning
dispositions conform to condi, then∑e De (φ) ·C (Ue ) =∑e C (e | Te ) ·C (Te ) = C (φ).
20 Cf. Weisberg (2007). In §2.2 below, I’ll suggest that there’s a close connection between exter-
nalism and a modest uncertainty about whether or not you will update on your total evidence.
21 For more, see Joyce (1998, 2009) and Pettigrew (2016a).
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the properties explained in this note.22 If A has these properties, then I’ll say
that it is a ‘nice’ measure of accuracy. All of the accuracy measures which have
been defended in the recent literature will count as nice, in this sense.
Once we have a measure of accuracy, we can use it to ask about the expected ac-
curacy of your learning dispositions. That is: we may ask how accurate you expect
your credences to be, once they’ve been updated. I’ll make the normative assump-
tion that we can evaluate learning dispositions in terms of their expected accuracy,
and, in particular, that learning dispositions are rational if theymaximize expected
accuracy. That is: I’ll suppose that learning dispositions are rational if, from your
current perspective, they are the ones which it would make the most sense for
you to adopt, were you concerned only with the accuracy of your credences.23 In
making this assumption, I am allying myself with so-called ‘accuracy first’ epis-
temologists, who wish to derive all seemingly evidential epistemic norms from
the imperative to rationally pursue accuracy.24 This is a controversial allegiance.
There are many worries we could raise about accuracy-first epistemology.25 Still, I
think the accuracy-first project is an ambitious and compelling research program,
and I think it is well worth exploring the kind of externalism which it produces.
Greaves & Wallace (2006) showed that, if we assume that internalism is
correct, evidence is factive, and accuracy is measured nicely, then the learning
dispositions which maximize expected accuracy are just the ones prescribed by
condi. But what if externalism is correct? In this case, Schoenfield (2017a)
showed that, so long as accuracy is measuredly nicely, you will maximize expected
accuracy iff you are disposed to condition, not on your total evidence, but rather
on the proposition that it is your total evidence. Let’s call this norm Schoenfield
conditionalization, or just ‘scondi’.26
22 I assume that A is additive, extensional, and strictly proper. A is additive iff it is of the form
A (C ,w ) = ∑φ λφ · A (C (φ),φ,w ), for some weights λφ > 0 of the importance of having
an accurate credence in the proposition φ and some function A (x ,φ,w ) of the accuracy of
a credence x in the proposition φ in world w . It is extensional iff there are functionsA1 andA0 such thatA (x ,φ,w ) =A1(x ) if w ∈ φ andA (x ,φ,w ) =A0(x ) if w /∈ φ. A is strictly
proper iff, for every probabilistic credence function P , the unique credence function C which
maximizes∑w P (w ) ·A (C ,w ) is P itself.
23 Though, to be clear, I don’t think that, in order for you to count as rational, you have to do any-
thing like choose your learning dispositions, or recognize that they maximize expected accuracy.
24 See, e.g., Joyce (1998, 2009), Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a,b), Pettigrew (2011, 2012, 2016a,b,
2018), Levinstein (2012), Caie (2013), Easwaran (2013), Bronfman (2014), Schoenfield
(2015, 2017b, 2018), and Fitelson et al. (ms).
25 See, for instance, Berker (2013), Greaves (2013), Carr (2017), Caie (2018), Blackwell &
Drucker (2019), and Oddie (2019).
26 Schoenfield calls this rule ‘conditionalization∗’. Hild (1998a,b) proposes the same update rule
and calls it ‘auto-epistemic conditionalization’. Schoenfield (2017a) does not directly discuss
learning dispositions, but rather update procedures.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: In figure 5a, your current credences. You think the hand is equally likely to
be at any of the four positions. In figure 5b, the credences scondi says you should be
disposed to adopt upon learning that ¬4 (and no more). You should become certain that
T¬4—that is, you should become certain that the clock hand is pointed at position 2.
Schoenfield Conditionalization
Be disposed to respond to the total evidence e by adopting your cur-
rent credence function, C , conditioned on Te .
(scondi) De (p)
!= C (p | Te )
To understand what scondi says, return to our simplified model of Williamson’s
clock. Suppose that you think the clock hand is equally likely to point at any
of the four positions (figure 5a). Then, scondi says that, upon learning that the
hand isn’t at position 4 (and no more), you should be disposed to become certain
that you have learned this, T¬4. Since your total evidence will be ¬4 iff the clock
hand is at position 2, scondi says to become certain that the clock hand is at
position 2 (figure 5b).
An externalist should be uncomfortable with this recommendation. Remem-
ber, the externalist thinks that, in cases like Williamson’s clock, your evidence
must leave a margin-for-error. It is for this reason that they insist that, if the clock
hand is at 2, your evidence must leave it open that it is at position 1 or 3 instead.
While scondi grants the externalist a margin-for-error when it comes to evidence,
it denies that there is any margin-for-error when it comes to rational certainty.
Because scondi says that it is rational for you to condition on Te , it says that
it is rational for you to be certain that Te . Let’s say that some fact is within your
epistemic reach if it’s rational for you to be certain of that fact. Then, according to
scondi, what your evidence says is always within your epistemic reach. It is always
rational for you to be certain about what your evidence says or doesn’t say. This
is something an externalist should be uncomfortable saying. Externalists should
want to endorse the thesis I’ll call certainty externalism.
Certainty Externalism
Your total evidence may be e without it being rational for you to be
certain that your total evidence is e
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TheWilliamsonian arguments for externalism carry over straightforwardly to cer-
tainty externalism. If anything, those arguments are stronger when transposed
into the key of rational certainty. If they establish externalism, then they should
likewise establish certainty externalism. So externalists should be certainty exter-
nalists. But this means rejecting scondi, since scondi says that it is always certain
what your evidence says.
We’ve seen that scondi follows from externalism, together with the impera-
tive tomaximize expected accuracy. For this reason, the foregoing could be viewed
as an argument against externalism. If the externalist adopts the dispositions to
learn from their evidence which maximize expected accuracy, then they will never
be uncertain about what their evidence says. But their externalism should commit
them to the possibility of rational uncertainty like this. What is the externalist to
do? They could, of course, reject the assumptions of accuracy-first epistemology.
For instance, they could say that the telos of belief is knowledge, not accuracy,
and therefore insist that it can be irrational to do what you expect to get you
closest to truth. Alternatively, they could try to motivate accepting externalism
about evidence, but not externalism about rational certainty. Both of these op-
tions are available, but I have another suggestion—a suggestion which allows the
externalist to maintain a close connection between rational learning dispositions
and the rational pursuit of accuracy, without forcing them to give up certainty
externalism.
My suggestion is that the externalist reject one of the assumptions made back
at the beginning of this section. There, I assumed that in every possibility in which
the stimulus condition Te is true, you will manifest the response of adopting
the new credences De . This implicitly assumes that you take your dispositions
to respond to evidence to be flawless. It assumes that you foresee no possibility
in which your learning dispositions misfire—no possibility in which your total
evidence is e , but you mistake it for the nearby evidence f ̸= e , and therefore
incorrectly update to the new credence function D f . If that’s so, then you will be
certain, in advance, that you’ll update on the evidence e iff e is your total evidence,
for every e ∈ E . Some terminology: if C (Ue ↔ Te ) = 1, for every e ∈ E , then
let’s say that you are immodest. And if you are less than certain to respond correctly
to your total evidence—if C (Ue ↔ Te ) < 1, for some e ∈ E—then let’s say that
you are modest.27 The learning dispositions recommmended by scondi need not
maximize expected accuracy if you are modest. Somy suggestion to the externalist
is this: plead modesty—maintain that rationality permits thinking that you may
27 Beware: this terminology is slightly idiosyncratic. Others will call youmodest if you are less than
certain that your current credences are rational—let’s call this synchronic modesty. According to
the theory of learning I’ll defend below, modesty in my sense will lead to synchronic modesty
after you’ve rationally updated on your evidence.
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Figure 6: w1,w2, and w3 are each possibilities in which your evidence tells you that the
clock hand does not point at 3, T¬3. At w1, you correctly update on this evidence, U¬3.
While, at w2, you incorrectly update as if your evidence told you that it wasn’t at position
2, U¬2. And, at w3, you incorrectly update as if your evidence told you that it isn’t at
position 4, U¬4.
mistake your evidence.28
If you think your learning dispositions may misfire, then we should explic-
itly represent this possibility in our modelling. Return to our simple model of
Williamson’s clock. Let’s complicate things slightly by supposing that, when the
clock hand is actually pointing at 1, and therefore, your evidence tells you that it’s
not pointing at 3, you may correctly update on ¬3, but you may also mistakenly
respond as if your evidence had told you that it’s not pointing at 2, or as if your
evidence had told you that it’s not pointing at 4. And let’s suppose, symmetri-
cally, that when the clock hand is actually pointing at 2, so that your evidence
tells you it’s not pointing at 4, you may correctly update on ¬4, but you may also
err by taking your evidence to say either ¬3 or ¬1 instead. And similarly if your
evidence tells you ¬1 or ¬2. (See figure 6.)
I’ll assume not only that you modestly foresee the possibility of mistaking
your evidence. I’ll also assume that you have opinions about how likely you are to
do so. For instance, in our simple version of Williamson’s clock, let’s suppose that
you think you’re 80% likely to correctly update on your evidence, but you think
you’re 20% likely to err, either clockwise or counterclockwise by a single position.
If you think that the clock hand is just as likely to point at 1 as it is to point at 2,
28 The distinction between modesty and immodesty is closely related to Schoenfield (2015, 2018)
and Steel (2018)’s distinction between the plans which are best to conform to and those which
are best to make, or to try to conform to. If you are modest, then the plan which it would be
best to conform to could come apart from the plan which it would be best to make. Though, if
you are immodest, the plan which would be best to conform to will always be the plan which
would be best to make.
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3, or 4, then your credences about what you’ll learn and how you’ll update your
credences are shown in figure 7a.
If your learning dispositions are certain to not misfire, then, at each world w
in which your total evidence is e , you are certain to adopt De . So the accuracy
of your learning dispositions at world w ∈ Te is given by A (De ,w ). We may
then evaluate your learning dispositions with the expectation∑e∈E∑w∈Te C (w )·
A (De ,w ). How should we evaluate learning dispositions which may misfire?
This question turns out to be a bit complicated. If your learning dispositions may
misfire, then, at a world w in which your total evidence is e , it is not certain
how you would update your credences, were you to adopt the dispositions D .
You think there’s a probability of C (Ue | Te ) that you would correctly respond
to your evidence, but for some f ̸= e , you think there’s a non-zero probability
C (U f | Te ) that you would instead respond as if your evidence had told you f .
So: if your learning dispositions may misfire, then we should say that the accuracy
of your learning dispositions, at a world w ∈ Te , would end up beingA (D f ,w )
with a probability of C (U f | Te ), for each f ∈ E . So the expected accuracy of
your learning dispositions at world w ∈ Te is ∑ f ∈E C (U f | Te ) · A (D f ,w ).






C (w ) ·∑
f ∈E
C (U f | Te ) ·A (D f ,w )
Or so I think. But you may disagree. Consider the world w1 in figure 6. This
is a world in which your learning dispositions don’t misfire. So it is certain in ad-
vance that, at w1, the accuracy of your learning dispositions will beA (D¬3,w1).
In general, for any possible world w ∈Ue , you may wish to say that your accuracy







C (w ) ·A (De ,w )
I disagree because I believe that, when we are evaluating your learning dis-
positions, we should not ask, indicatively: how accurate will these learning dis-
positions be? Instead, we should ask, subjunctively: how accurate would these
learning dispositions be? That is: I disagree because I am a causal decision theo-
rist. When I evaluate a chancy act like flipping a coin at a world, w , I don’t say:
since the coin lands heads at w , the value of the flip at w is the value of heads.
Instead, I say: were I to flip the coin at w , I’d have a 50% probability of heads
and a 50% probability of tails, so the value of the flip at w is 50% times the value
of heads plus 50% times the value of tails. Likewise: even though w1 is a world
at which I do update on ¬3, it is not a world at which, were I to adopt my (po-
tentially misfiring) learning dispositions, I would update on ¬3. Rather, I would
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have an 80% probability of updating on ¬3, a 10% probability of updating on
¬2, and a 10% probability of updating on ¬4. So the accuracy of D at w1 is 80%
times the accuracy of D¬3 plus 10% times the accuracy of D¬2, plus 10% times
the accuracy of D¬4. For the interested reader, I have more to say about why I
favor (1) in appendix A.29
IfA is a nice measure of accuracy, then your (potentially misfiring) learning
dispositions will maximize the expectation (2) iff you are disposed to condition
on the proposition that you’ve updated on your total evidence. That is: you’ll
maximize (2) by conforming to what I’ll call update conditionalization.30
Update Conditionalization
Be disposed to respond to total evidence e by conditioning on Ue .
(upcondi) De (φ)
!= C (φ |Ue )
Parenthetically: you may worry about a proposition like Ue showing up on
the right-hand-side of upcondi. For ðUeñ says that you’ve updated on e , which
means that you’ve taken your evidence to be e and adopted De in response. But
the right-hand-side of upcondi is supposed to be telling us what De should be.
Does this make the rule self-referential? No. ðUeñ says only that you’ve taken
your total evidence to be e and, in response, adopted the new credence—whatever
it may be—which you are disposed to adopt in that stimulus condition. So, by
including a proposition like Ue , the learning norm upcondi presupposes that
you have some learning dispositions or other—that there is some credence you’re
disposed to adopt if your total evidence is e—but it does not presuppose anything
about what those learning dispositions are. The norm tells you what they should
be.31
In our simplified model of Williamson’s clock, the result of updating on ¬4
with upcondi is shown in figure 7b. After updating on the evidence that the
clock hand is not at position 4, you’ll think that it’s most likely at position 2
(80%), though you’ll save some credence for it being at 1 or 3 instead (10% each).
Thus, while you’ll think that your evidence likely told you that the clock hand
isn’t at position 4 (80%), you’ll think that it could have instead told you it’s not at
29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to say more about why I favor evaluating
learning dispositions with (1) rather than (2).
30 Since {Ue | e ∈ E} is a partition, this follows fromTheorem 2 of Greaves & Wallace (2006).
31 Of course, if you know what your learning dispositions in fact are, then you won’t recognize any
live possibilities in which Ue is true but you don’t adopt the credence function De . The point
is just that the definition of the proposition ðUeñ doesn’t make any reference to a particular
credence function, so there’s no self-reference involved in the norm upcondi. Compare: if you
know that you’ll greet Rachel, then you won’t recognize any live possibilities in which Rachel is
not the person you greet; but this does not mean that the imperative to greet Rachel involves
any self-reference. Thanks to Harvey Lederman and Adam Elga for helpful conversation on this
point.
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1∧T¬3 2∧T¬4 3∧T¬1 4∧T¬2
U¬3 8/40 1/40 0 1/40
U¬4 1/40 8/40 1/40 0
U¬1 0 1/40 8/40 1/40
U¬2 1/40 0 1/40 8/40
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
(a)
1∧T¬3 2∧T¬4 3∧T¬1 4∧T¬2
U¬3 0 0 0 0
U¬4 1/10 8/10 1/10 0
U¬1 0 0 0 0
U¬2 0 0 0 0
1/10 8/10 1/10 0
(b)
1∧T¬3 2∧T¬4 3∧T¬1 4∧T¬2
U¬3 8/100 8/100 0 0
U¬4 1/100 64/100 1/100 0
U¬1 0 8/100 8/100 0
U¬2 1/100 0 1/100 0
1/10 8/10 1/10 0
(c)
Figure 7: Given the prior credences in figure 7a, the result of conditioning on ¬4 with
upcondi is shown in figure 7b, and the result of updating on ¬4 with excondi is shown
in figure 7c.
3 or not at 1 (10% each). So you will not be certain about what your total evidence
is. So these learning dispositions permit uncertainty about what your evidence
says. For externalists, this should be seen as improvement on scondi.
Notice that, if you are disposed to learn from your evidence in the way pre-
scribed by upcondi, then you will always end up certain of how you’ve updated
your credences. This is prima facie odd, given that your evidence did not tell
you anything at all about your credences. By stipulation, your evidence only tells
you something about the position of the clock hand. Of course, after looking
at the clock, you could end up learning something about how your credences
have changed, but you need not—perhaps you do not have introspective access
to your own opinions. More generally, if rationality requires conforming to up-
condi, then rationality forbids uncertainty about how you’ve updated your cre-
dences. Frommy perspective, this is another reason to be suspicious of evaluating
learning dispositions with (2), but I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that the reader
disagrees.
If we instead evaluate your (potentially misfiring) learning dispositions with
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the expectation (1), as I recommend, then the optimal learning dispositions will
be the ones conforming to what I will call externalist conditionalization.
Externalist Conditionalization
Be disposed to respond to the total evidence e by changing your cre-
dence in T f to your current credence in T f , conditional on Ue ,
C (T f | Ue ), and holding fixed your credence in each proposition





C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
(To understand why excondi maximizes the expectation (1), see the proof of
Proposition 1 in appendix B.) In our simplified model of Williamson’s clock, the
result of updating on ¬4 with excondi is shown in figure 7c. When it comes
to your opinions about the position of the clock hand, excondi agrees with up-
condi. You will think that the clock hand is most likely at position 2 (80%),
though you’ll save some credence for it being at 1 or 3 instead (10% each). For
this reason, you will be uncertain about what your evidence is. Again, externalists
should see this as an advantage of excondi. Moreover, if you only learn about
the position of the clock hand, and you don’t additionally learn something about
how your credences have changed, then updating with excondi will leave you
uncertain of how your credences have changed. You’ll think that, most likely,
you’ve updated on ¬4 (66%), though you’ll think that you may have updated on
¬3 or ¬1 instead (16% each), and you’ll even put aside some credence (2%) for
the possibility that you’ve updated on ¬2.
In §2.1, we saw an argument that your learning dispositions ought to satisfy
the principle of reflection. In contrast to condi, both upcondi and excondi
will always satisfy this principle.32 So neither of these update rules will permit the
kind of deliberate self-delusion we encountered in §2.1.
Suppose that your learning dispositions are certain to not misfire—that is,
suppose that you are immodest. Then, both upcondi and excondi will agree
32 To see that upcondi satisfies reflection, note that the law of total probability tells us that
C (φ) =
∑
e∈E C (φ |Ue )·C (Ue ), which, according to upcondi, should be∑e∈E De (φ)·C (Ue ).
To see that excondi satisfies it, note that, according to excondi:∑
e∈E









C (φ | T f ) ·∑
e∈E




C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f )
= C (φ)
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with scondi.33 As we saw above, scondi says to be disposed to become certain
of what your evidence says. So both upcondi and excondi say that you should
be disposed to become certain of what your evidence says if you are certain in
advance to not make a mistake about what your evidence says. If, however, you
modestly foresee the possibility that you’ll mistake your evidence, revising your
opinions as if your evidence told you f , when in fact it told you e , then you
should not be disposed to end up certain about what your evidence has told you.
3 Applications
The update rule excondi provides a general theory of learning for the externalist.
This theory tells us interesting things about the rationality of epistemic akrasia
(§3.1), peer disagreement (§3.2), failures of Negative Access and undercutting de-
feat (§3.3), and learning without certainty (§3.4). (In this section, I will focus
exclusively on excondi, since this is the update rule which I think the external-
ist should endorse. But much of what I’ll have to say here could be said with
upcondi instead, mutatis mutandis.)
3.1 Epistemic Akrasia
Suppose your evidence supports believing that it will rain. Since you are rational,
you correctly respond to your evidence and believe that it will rain. Then, new
evidence comes in. It tells you that you probably mistook some of your earlier evi-
dence, and your belief that it will rain is likely irrational. What should you believe
now? Lasonen-Aarnio (2014, 2015, forthcoming) suggests that, if your original
evidence supported believing that it will rain, then, conjoined with your new ev-
idence, it will still support believing that it will rain. So you should continue to
believe that it will rain. Of course, your new evidence also supports believing that
this is an irrational belief. So you should believe: it will rain and it’s irrational to
believe that it will rain. That is, you should be episitemically akratic.34
In the case of credences, Lasonen-Aarnio does not think that there are any
necessary rational connections between your credences and your credences about
which credences are rational. That is: she does not think that there are any enkratic
33 If C (Ue ↔ Te ) = 1, then C (φ | Ue ) = C (φ | Te ), so upcondi agrees with scondi. And, if
C (Ue ↔ Te ) = 1, then C (Te |Ue ) = 1, while C (T f |Ue ) = 0 if f ̸= e . So excondi says:
De (φ)
!= C (φ | Te ) ·C (Te |Ue ) + ∑
f ̸=e
C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
= C (φ | Te ) · 1 + ∑
f ̸=e
C (φ | T f ) · 0
= C (φ | Te )
34 See also Horowitz (2014) and Greco (2014).
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: In figure 8a, the rational credences to have, given the evidence ¬4. In figure
8b, the rational credences to have, given the evidence ¬3.
requirements on credences. Elga (2013) disagrees. He believes that, for any
proposition φ, your credence in φ must harmonize with your credences about
which credence in φ is rational. Return to our simplified model of Williamson’s
clock. Suppose your evidence tells you that the clock hand is not at position 4,
you update on this evidence with excondi, and arrive at the credences D¬4 (fig-
ure 8a). These are the rational credences to hold, given your evidence, but you’re
not certain about whether they are rational. You think the clock hand might be
at position 1, in which case D¬3 (figure 8b) are the rational credences to have.
Conditional on D¬3 being the rational credences, which credences should you
have? A natural first thought is this: conditional on D¬3 being rational, your
credences should agree with D¬3. In general, conditional on D f being rational,
your credences should agree with D f . Call this principle rational reflection.35
Rational Reflection
Conditional on D f being the rational credences for you to hold, your
credences should agree with D f .
De (φ | D f is rational) = D f (φ)
De (φ | T f ) = D f (φ)(rat ref)
(Here, I’m assuming that your evidence was actually e , so that De are actually the
rational credences for you to hold. And I’m assuming that you’re certain that D f
is rational iff your total evidence was f , T f .)
Elga thinks that rat ref is not quite right. If D¬3 is rational, then your
evidence tells you that the clock hand isn’t at 3. And you are certain that your
evidence tells you this iff the clock hand is at 1. So, conditional on D¬3 being ra-
tional, you should be certain that the clock hand points at 1. ButD¬3 is not certain
of that. The reason is that D¬3 is not certain that it is rational. So, conditional
on D¬3 being rational, you are assured of something which D¬3 is not. Before
35 See Christensen (2010)
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you align your credences with D¬3, you should assure it that it is rational.36 So
what’s exactly right isn’t rat ref, but instead the principle Elga calls new rational
reflection.
New Rational Reflection
Conditional on D f being the rational credences for you to hold, your
credences should agree with D f , once D f is informed that it is ratio-
nal.
De (φ | D f is rational) = D f (φ | D f is rational)
De (φ | T f ) = D f (φ | T f )(new rat ref)
This is an enkratic principle which says how your views about the requirements
of rationality should constrain your other views. It is the kind of principle which
Lasonen-Aarnio rejects. Indeed, Lasonen-Aarnio (2015) argues against new
rat ref by showing that, if an externalist learns from their evidence in the way
prescribed by condi, then they will sometimes violate the principle. To mymind,
this is not a reason to reject new rat ref, but rather yet another reason why
an externalist should reject condi. Notice that, if an externalist updates their
credences in accordance with excondi, they will always satisfy new rat ref.37 So
if you abide excondi, you will always be epistemically enkratic. When you are
uncertain about whether you are rational, you will see reason to think that your
credences are irrational as a reason to revise those credences.
(Note: there are two ways to be uncertain about what rationality requires of
you. You could be certain about what rationality requires if your evidence tells
you e , what it requires if your evidence tells you f , and so on, but be uncertain
what your evidence tells you. This is the kind of uncertainty about the require-
ments of rationality which arises from externalism. Alternatively, you could be
uncertain about what rationality requires of you when your evidence tells you e .
That is: you could be uncertain about the a priori requirements of rationality.
Lasonen-Aarnio thinks that both kinds of uncertainty can be rational. For an
36 Cf. Hall (1994) and Lewis (1994).
37 To see this, note that, for any e , f ∈ E , De (φ | T f ) = C (φ | T f ).
De (φ | T f ) = De (φ∧T f )De (T f )
=
∑
g∈E C (φ∧T f | T g ) ·C (T g |Ue )∑
g∈E C (T f | T g ) ·C (T g |Ue )
=
C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
C (T f | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
= C (φ | T f )
So De (φ | T f ) will equal D f (φ | T f ), since they are both equal to C (φ | T f ).
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1∧T¬3 2∧T¬4 3∧T¬1 4∧T¬2
U¬3 8/20 1/20 0 0
U¬4 1/20 8/20 0 0
U¬1 0 1/20 0 0
U¬2 1/20 0 0 0
1/2 1/2 0 0
Figure 9: If your epistemic peer is just as likely to respond correctly to their evidence as
you are, and how they respond to their evidence is independent of how you do, then this
is the result of updating the credence D¬4 from figure 7c on the new evidence that your
peer updated on ¬3.
argument that the second kind of uncertainty is never rationally permitted, see
Titelbaum (2015). Throughout, my discussion is restricted to only the first kind
of uncertainty.)
3.2 Peer Disagreement
Suppose it wasn’t just you that looked at the clock. Suppose an epistemic peer of
yours also took a glimpse at the clock, in exactly the same circumstances as you, so
that you are certain that both you and your peer learned the same thing. Suppose
that, like you, your peer is 80% likely to respond rationally to their evidence,
but they have a 20% probability of mistaking their evidence, and they are equally
likely to err in either the clockwise or counterclockwise direction. For the sake
of concreteness, suppose you think that whether/how your learning dispositions
misfire is independent of whether/how your peer’s learning dispositions misfire.
Both you and your peer learn ¬4. You rationally respond to your evidence and
end up with the credences shown in figures 7c and 8a. Your peer, on the other
hand, responds irrationally, and ends up thinking that that clock hand is 80%
likely to be at position 1 (as in figure 8b).
Applied to this case, the question of peer disagreement is whether learning
about your peer’s opinion gives you any reason to revise your views about the
position of the clock hand. In general, a conciliationist says: learning that an epis-
temic peer disagrees with you does give you reason to revise your views. In cases
like this, excondi agrees with the conciliationist. Suppose you have the credences
in figure 7c, and then learn how your peer updated their credences. When you
learn this, your total evidence will be either that your peer has updated on ¬1,
that they’ve updated on ¬2, that they’ve updated on ¬3, or that they’ve updated
on ¬4. Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that you are immodestly certain to respond
correctly to this evidence (though, of course, you still modestly think you may
have responded incorrectly to your evidence about the clock hand’s position).
Then, if you learn that your peer updated on ¬3, you will end up with the cre-
dences shown in figure 9. The disagreement of your peer has given you reason to
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revise your views about where the clock hand is located. You now think that it’s
50% likely to be at 1 and 50% likely to be at 2. (Since your peer was certain to not
update on ¬3 if the clock hand were pointing at 3, you are now certain that it’s
not at 3.)
More generally, if you are modest and you learn from your evidence in the
way excondi says you should, then you can end up thinking that your credence
in φ might be irrational, and you will satisfy new rat ref, so you will see reason
to think that your credence inφ is irrational as reason to change that credence. In
general, learning that an epistemic peer has responded differently to your shared
evidence can give you reason to think that your learning dispositions have mis-
fired, and that your credence that φ is irrational. And so: learning that an epis-
temic peer has responded differently to your shared evidence can give you reason
to revise your credence in φ.38
3.3 Failures of Negative Access and Undercutting Defeat
Thus far, I have been focusing on cases, like Williamson’s clock, in which Positive
Access is violated. But excondi applies in cases in whichNegative Access is violated
as well. Suppose you are about to bite into a pear and learn whether it tastes sweet.
Before biting, you think it’s 50% likely to taste sweet. Incidentally, you also think
it’s 20% likely that Sabeen has slipped you a psychotropic drug. This drug renders
you incapable of properly categorizing flavor experiences. Drug-free, you are able
to recognize how things taste to you. Drugged, your opinions about how things
taste correlate not at all with the way they actually taste to you. When drugged,
you are not able to tell that you are drugged. You bite into the pear. In the good
case, you are drug free, and your evidence tells you that the pear tastes sweet to
you. In the bad case, you are drugged, and you have no evidence about how the
pear tastes to you, though you end up unreasonably confident that it tastes sweet.
In the bad case, your evidence doesn’t tell you that the pear is sweet, ¬Es , nor does
your evidence tell you that you’re not in the good case; so your evidence doesn’t
say that it doesn’t say that the pear is sweet, ¬E¬Es . SoNegative Access is violated.
Suppose that, if you’re drug-free, ¬d , then you will learn how the pear tastes
to you. If it tastes sweet, s , then you will learn that it tastes sweet, Ts . If it
doesn’t taste sweet, ¬s , then you will learn that it doesn’t taste sweet, T¬s . If
you are drugged, d , then you won’t learn anything at all, T⊤. If you are drug-
free, then you will update on whatever your evidence tells you. However, if you
are drugged, then your learning dispositions will mis-fire, and you’ll incorrectly
update on either s or ¬s (with equal probability), even though you’ve learned
neither. Before biting into the pear, you have the credences shown in figure 10a.
In fact, you are drug-free, and the pear tastes sweet. If you update on s with
38 See Steel (2018) and Schoenfield (2018) for similar justifications of conciliationism.
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¬d ∧ s ∧Ts ¬d ∧¬s ∧T¬s d ∧ s ∧T⊤ d ∧¬s ∧T⊤
Us 8/20 0 1/20 1/20
U¬s 0 8/20 1/20 1/20
4/10 4/10 1/10 1/10
(a) Before tasting the pear
¬d ∧ s ∧Ts ¬d ∧¬s ∧T¬s d ∧ s ∧T⊤ d ∧¬s ∧T⊤
Us 16/20 0 1/20 1/20
U¬s 0 0 1/20 1/20
8/10 0 1/10 1/10
(b) The result of updating on s with excondi
¬d ∧ s ∧Ts ¬d ∧¬s ∧T¬s d ∧ s ∧T⊤ d ∧¬s ∧T⊤
Us 8/10 0 1/10 0
U¬s 0 0 1/10 0
8/10 0 2/10 0
(c) The result of updating on s with condi
Figure 10
excondi, you’ll arrive at the new credences shown in figure 10b. You’ll continue
thinking that it’s 20% likely you’ve been drugged, and your credence that the pear
is sweet will rise from 50% to 90%.
Contrast excondi’s advice about this case with the advice of condi. If you
abide condi, then, after learning that the pear tastes sweet, you will be certain that
the pear tastes sweet (figure 10c). Conditioning can never lower a proposition’s
credence from one, so once you are certain that the pear tastes sweet, you will re-
main certain that it tastes sweet forever after. But suppose you receive (misleading)
evidence that Sabeen drugged you. Evidence like this provides undercutting defeat
for your high credence that the pear tastes sweet. If you’ve reason to raise your
credence that d , then you’ve reason to lower your credence that s . Nonetheless, if
you’re disposed to learn from your evidence in the way condi recommends, then
your credence in s will not be affected by learning that you’re likely drugged.39
Not so with excondi. Updating on s with excondi introduces a dependence
between your credence that d and your credence that s . Once you’ve learned
from your evidence in the way recommended by excondi, you’ll see misleading
evidence that you were drugged as a reason to become less confident that the pear
tastes sweet.40
39 See Christensen (1992), Weisberg (2009, 2015), and Gallow (2014).
40 A defender of condi may suggest that, instead of conditioning on s , you should instead con-
dition on the material conditional ¬d → s (Wagner, 2013). This will have the unfortunate
consequence of raising your credence that you’ve been drugged from 20% to over 33% (see Gal-
low, 2014). A defender of condi could also, of course, just deny that there are failures of
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In my younger and more vulnerable years, I suggested an update rule, called
holistic conditionalization, for learning episodes like these (Gallow, 2014). In
this case, the input to the rule would be the set of ordered pairs {< ¬d , s >,<
d ,⊤ >}, which I gave the following interpretation: if ¬d is true, then your total
evidence is s ; and, if d is true, you have no evidence at all. More generally, holistic
conditionalization says how to be disposed to revise your credences given a set of
ordered pairs {< ti , ei >}i , with the interpretation that, for each i , if ti is true,
then your total evidence is ei .
Holistic Conditionalization
Given the input E = {< ti , ei >}i , be disposed to adopt the new
credence function DE , where, for each proposition φ,
(hcondi) DE (φ) =
∑
i
C (φ | ti ∧ ei ) ·C (ti )
In this case, hcondi and excondi agree. If you follow hcondi’s advice about how
to revise the credences from figure 10a, given the input {< ¬d , s >,< d ,⊤ >},
then you will get the same result as updating on s with excondi (figure 10b).
More generally, suppose that, if the background theory t is true, then you will
learn the true member of {e1, e2, . . . , eN }, where these potential evidence propo-
sitions are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. If t is false, then you’ll not
learn anything at all, though you’ll still update as though you had learned one of
the propositions in {e1, e2, . . . , eN }. This is the kind of ‘theory-dependent’ exper-
iment which hcondi was designed to handle. And, in this experiment, the result
of updating on the evidence e with excondi will be:41
De (φ) = C (φ | t ∧ e ) ·C (t |Ue ) + C (φ | ¬t ) ·C (¬t |Ue )
If whether you update on e is independent of whether the background theory t
is true, C (t | Ue ) = C (t ), then excondi will deliver exactly the same result as
updating on the input {< t , e >,< ¬t ,⊤ >} with hcondi. If Ue is not indepen-
dent of t , then excondi and hcondi need not agree. But this is for the good,
since the fact that hcondi always holds fixed your credence in the background
theory t is a problem for that rule. Suppose you know that the chance of the pear
tasting sweet is one in a million, while the chance of Sabeen slipping you the drug
is one half. Then, you should be disposed to become very confident that you’ve
been slipped the drug if you learn that the pear tastes sweet. But hcondi dis-
agrees, saying that you should remain 50% confident that you’ve been slipped the
Negative Access like this. If externalism is false, then condi won’t face objections like these.
41 To see this, note that: 1) you are certain in advance that Te ↔ t ∧ e , for each e ; 2) you are
certain that T⊤↔ ¬t ; and 3) if t is true, you will update on e iff e is true, so that C (t ∧ e |
Ue ) = C (t |Ue ) and C (t ∧ e |U f ) = 0 if e ̸= f .
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b ∧Tb v ∧Tv g ∧T g
Ub 7/30 2/30 1/30
Uv 2/30 7/30 1/30
U g 1/30 1/30 8/20
1/3 1/3 1/3
(a) Before looking
b ∧Tb v ∧Tv g ∧T g
Ub 49/100 4/100 1/100
Uv 14/100 14/100 1/100
U g 7/100 2/100 8/100
7/10 2/10 1/10
(b) The result of updating on b with excondi
Figure 11
drug.42 In contrast, excondi says that, if C (d | Us ) ≫ C (d ), then you should
be disposed to become much more confident that you’ve been slipped the drug
upon learning that the pear tastes sweet.
3.4 Learning without Certainty
Thus far, I have been focusing on cases in which it becomes rational for you to
become certain that some proposition is true. But excondi does not require cer-
tainty in any new proposition. Suppose that you are about to observe a cloth in
dim lighting. You know the cloth is either blue, violet, or green, and you think
each color is equally likely. You know that your experience will teach you its true
color. But, because the lighting is so dim, you will find your experience difficult
to discern, and so you are not certain to correctly learn experience’s lesson. If the
cloth is blue, you think you’re most likely to recognize it as blue (70%), though
you may incorrectly take it to be violet (20%) or green (10%) instead. Similarly,
if it’s violet, you’ll most likely recognize it as violet (70%), though you may incor-
rectly think it’s blue (20%) or green (10%). And, if it’s green, you’ll most likely
recognize it as green (80%), though perhaps you’ll instead mistake it for blue or
violet (10% each). Then, before looking at the cloth, your credences are as shown
in figure 11a. Suppose you look at the cloth and learn that it is blue. Excondi
says that you should be disposed to respond to this evidence by becoming 70%
confident that the cloth is blue, 20% confident that it is violent, and 10% confi-
dent that it is green. The result of updating the distribution from figure 11a on b
with excondi is shown in figure 11b. Notice that, though your credences about
the cloth’s color have changed, you have not become certain of any proposition.
42 I recognized this problem and suggested a rule for updating your credences in the background
theories, but the rule was overly complicated and under-motivated; I no longer accept it.
updating for externalists 30 of 30
Learning episodes like this are discussed by Jeffrey (1965) (though Jeffrey
thinks about them differently from the way I am suggesting we think about them
here).43 In Jeffrey’s treatment, the input to a revision of your credences is a set
of ordered pairs {< ei ,αi >}i of propositions, ei , and real numbers, αi—and
Jeffrey supposes that the ei are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and
that the αi sum to 1. Inputs like these are eponymously called ‘Jeffrey shifts’.
The interpretation of a Jeffrey shift like this is that αi is the new credence in ei
which has been rationalized by experience. In the case of the dimly-lit cloth, your
Jeffrey shift may be {< b ,70% >,< v,20% >,< g , 10% >}. If so, then the result
of updating on b with excondi (figure 11b) is exactly what is recommended by
Jeffrey’s learning norm, known as:
Jeffrey Conditionalization
Given the input E = {< ei ,αi >}i , be disposed to adopt the new
credence function DE , where, for each proposition φ,
(jcondi) DE (φ) =
∑
i
C (φ | ei ) ·αi
More generally, suppose that experience will teach the true member of {e1, e2, . . . ,
eN }, where these ei are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Then, updating
with excondi on e j is equivalent to updating with jcondi on the Jeffrey shift
{< ei ,C (Tei |Ue j ) >}i .44
To repeat: the way that Jeffrey thought about Jeffrey shifts is quite different
from the way I am suggesting we think about them. However, it is still note-
worthy that excondi provides us with a way of understanding learning episodes
which don’t rationalize certainty in any proposition; and that, equipped with this
understanding, the advice of excondi aligns with the advice of jcondi, given a
Jeffrey shift over the natural propositions.
4 In Summation
My goal has been to say how you should be disposed to revise your opinions
in light of your evidence, if externalism is true. Co-opting an argument from
Salow (2018), I’ve contended that, if externalism is true, then we should reject
the orthodox Bayesian learning norm conditionalization. If externalism is true,
43 See also Field (1978), who presents a rule similar to Jeffrey’s, and suggests a different way of
thinking about these learning experiences.
44 Since experience will teach exactly one ei , {Te1,Te2, . . . ,TeN } is a partition. Since experience
will teach the true ei , Tei entails ei . Since the ei are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive,




i C (φ | Tei ) · C (Tei | Ue j ) =∑i C (φ | ei ) · C (Tei | Ue j ), which is the result of
updating with jcondi on {< ei ,C (Tei |Ue j ) >}i .
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then conditionalization allows you to engage in deliberate self-delusion, disposing
yourself to become more confident of some proposition, so long as that proposi-
tion is false. And learning dispositions like these are not rational. To seek out a
replacement for conditionalization, I supposed that learning dispositions which
maximize expected accuracy are rational. And I argued that, if your dispositions to
learn from your evidence are not perfect—if you modestly foresee some possibil-
ity of mistaking your evidence—then the expected accuracy maximizing learning
dispositions are those conforming to externalist conditionalization. Learning dis-
positions like these will never permit the kind of deliberate self-delusion which
conditionalization condoned. This theory of rational learning allows uncertainty
about what your evidence is; and so, it permits uncertainty about whether your
credences are rational or not. It forbids a form of epistemic akrasia, counsels
conciliation in certain cases of peer disagreement, appropriately handles cases of
undercutting defeat, and permits learning without certainty.
A Evaluating Learning Dispositions
In this appendix, I will say a bit more about why I think we should evaluate potentially
misfiring learning dispositions with the expectation (1).




where V(w∗) is the value of the world w∗ and CA is your credence function imaged on
A. As I will understand it, CA comes from your views about how likely it is that various
possibilities would result, were you to perform the act A. To capture these views, we’ll
introduce a probability function, wA, for each world w . If you think it’s x likely that
world w∗ would result, were you to perform A in w , then let’s say that wA(w∗) = x .46
From these probability functions, wA, and your credences, we define CA. We use wA(w∗)
to see what proportion of your credence in w should be transferred to the world w∗. CA
is the result of carrying out these transfers for every possible world w . That is: to get the
credence CA gives to w∗, you sum up a proportion wA(w∗) of the credence C gives to w ,






∗) ·C (w )(4)





∗) ·C (w ) ·V(w∗)(5)
Greaves (2013) raises a worry about evaluating learning dispositions with causal de-
cision theory. The worry is that causal decision theory advises you to accept ‘epistemic
bribes’, sacrificing accuracy in one proposition so as to cause yourself to have greater ac-
curacy in others. I’ve been persuaded by Konek & Levinstein (2019) that the proper
response to these kinds of worries is to re-conceptualize what causal decision theory is







45 See, for instance, Lewis (1981) and Joyce (1999). Not all formulations of causal decision theorists
utilize imaging functions in this way; but I’ll focus on these formulations here.
46 It’s important that we interpret the probability functions wA in this way. Suppose, instead, we







∗) ·C (w ) =∑
w
C (w∗ | A) ·C (w ) = C (w∗ | A) ·∑
w
C (w ) = C (w∗ | A)
In which case, imaging C on A reduces to conditioning C on A.
Then (5) may be re-written as: ∑
w
C (w ) ·VA(w )(7)
The interpretation is that VA(w ) tells us how practically valuable the act A is at the world
w . Corresponding to this algebraic trick is a shift in perspective: we don’t see causal
decision theory as saying that you should use subjunctive beliefs to evaluate acts. Instead,
it says something about how acts are to be evaluated. It says: you should measure the
value of an act at a world by considering the value of what would result from the act’s
performance at that world.
According to (6), the practical value of A at w is a function of two kinds of inputs:
1) probabilities, wA(w∗), which tell you how likely it is that performing A in w would
bring about w∗; and 2) values, V(w∗), which tell you how valuable the world w∗ is. The
probabilities wA(w∗) are necessary because, in some cases, it may not be certain what
would result from A’s performance in w . Using the values V(w∗) in (6) (rather than
V(w ), say) encodes the causalist’s committment to value acts in terms of the good they
are able to bring about—the good they are in a position to causally promote.
In the epistemic case, I think that we should evaluate learning dispositions in essen-
tially the same way as (7) evaluates acts. That is: we should use an expectation of the
form ∑
w
C (w ) ·VD (w )(8)
where VD (w ) says how epistemically valuable the learning dispositions D are at the world
w . And I think that we should value the learning dispositions D , at w , with:




∗) ·A (Dw∗ ,w )(9)
(‘Dw∗ ’ are the credences you adopt in w∗.) Here, as before, ‘wD (w∗)’ tells us how likely
it is that adopting D would bring about w∗. As before, this is necessary because, when
your learning dispositions may misfire, it will not be certain what would result from
adopting the learning dispositions D at w . Now, if epistemic value were just like practical
value, I would have written ‘A (Dw∗ ,w∗)’, instead of ‘A (Dw∗ ,w )’. That would amount
to saying: what’s valuable in learning dispositions is the accuracy that they are able to
bring about—the accuracy that they are in a position to causally promote. But I think,
with Konek & Levinstein, that this gets the direction-of-fit of doxastic states wrong.
Doxastic states don’t properly aim to change the world, but rather to accurately reflect
it. So when we evaluate the learning dispositions D at w , we should ignore whatever
accuracy those learning dispositions are in a position to causally promote; we shouldn’t
think about how accurate D would make themselves. We should only think about how
accurately they would reflect w . So I think that (9) gives the epistemic value of D at w .
Pick an arbitrary w , and let e be your total evidence in w . Then, we should suppose
that, for every f ∈ E , wD gives a probability of C (U f | Te ) to the propositionU f . That
is, if w ∈ Te , then w (U f ) = C (U f | Te ). For you think that, when your total evidence
is e , there’s a probability of C (U f | Te ) that your learning dispositions would lead you
to update on f . And the function wD should reflect this.47
Then, the epistemic value of D at a world w ∈ Te , will be:






















A (D f ,w ) ·C (U f | Te )(10)
And putting (10) together with (8) gives us the expectation (1).
B Technicalities
Proposition 1. Given any strictly proper, additive, and extensional measure of accuracy, the
potentially misfiring learning dispositions which maximize the expectation (1) are the ones
conforming to excondi.
Proof. IfA is additive, thenA (De ,w ) has the form∑φ λφ ·A (De (φ),φ,w ), for some
weights λφ > 0 and some function A (x ,φ,w ) of the accuracy of a credence x in the




C (w ) ·∑
e∈E
C (Ue | T f ) ·∑
φ









C (Ue | T f ) · ∑
w∈T f
C (w ) ·A (De (φ),φ,w )
Pick a φ and pick an e ∈ E . Let x def= De (φ). We want the choice of x which maximizes
the equation above. This will be the choice which maximizes∑
f ∈E
C (Ue | T f ) · ∑
w∈T f
C (w ) ·A (x ,φ,w )
IfA is extensional, then there is someA1 and someA0 such that
A (x ,φ,w ) =
 A1(x ) if w ∈φ
A0(x ) if w /∈φ
So the choice of x with maximal expected accuracy will be the one which maximizes
∑
f ∈E
C (Ue | T f )
 ∑
w∈T f ∩φ
C (w ) ·A1(x ) +
∑
w∈T f ∩¬φ





C (Ue | T f ) (A1(x ) ·C (T f ∧φ) + A0(x ) ·C (T f ∧¬φ))
47 As with the practical case, it’s important that we interpret the probability functions wD correctly.









C (T f ∧¬φ) ·C (Ue | T f )
!
If a choice of x maximizes this equation, then it will continue to maximize it if we divide
















C (T f ∧φ)
C (T f )






C (T f ∧¬φ)
C (T f )











C (¬φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
!
∑
f ∈E C (− | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue ) is a probability function, so the above may be written as
A1(x ) ·α + A0(x ) · (1−α)
with α :=∑ f C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue ). SinceA is strictly proper, α is the unique value
of x which maximizes the equation above. So, for any e and φ, the unique choice of




C (φ | T f ) ·C (T f |Ue )
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